When building a Strategic Information System (SIS), it may not be economically sound for a firm to be an innovator through the strategic deployment of information technology. The decreasing costs of the technology and the power of imitation may quickly curtail any competitive advantage acquired through SIS. On the other hand, the iron law of market competition prescribes that those who do not imitate superior solutions are driven out of business. This means that any successful SIS becomes a competitive necessity for every player in the industry. Tapping standard models of strategy analysis and data sources for industry analysis will lead to similar systems and enhance, rather than decrease, imitation. How then should a "true" SIS be developed? In order to avoid easy imitation, it should emerge from the grassroots of the organization, out of end-user hacking computing and tinkering. In this way, the innovative SIS is going to be highly entrenched with the specific culture of the firm. Top management needs to appreciate local fluctuations in system practices as a repository of unique innovations and commit adequate resources to their development, even if they fly in the face of traditional approaches. Rather than looking for standard models in the business strategy literature, SISs should be looked for in the theory and practice of organizational learning and innovation, both incremental and radical.
INTRODUCTION
and value experimentation at the grass roots level of an organization as a means to finding new directions.
In order to follow the pioneering examples of American Airlines' Sabre, McKesson's Economost and American • Similarly, a careful ex,mination of precedent-setting Hospital Supply's ASAP, current prescriptions for designSISs provides evidence of important roles for serendiping a Strategic Information System (SIS) include obtaining ity, reinvention, and other factors that are left out of top management awareness and identifying and implementaccount in the conventional approach to strategy ing applications that may generate competitive advantage.
development.
These systematic approaches are based on two main ingredients: a set of guidelines indicating how Information
There are both empirical and theoretical grounds, then, for Technology (IT) can support the business vis-a-vis the proposing new kinds of guidelines for SIS design. After competition and a plmining and implementation strategy issues associated with current SIS methodologies are (Bakos and Treacy 1986; Wiseman 1988; Ives and Lear- surfaced and the assumptions on which they rest have been month 1984; Cash and Konsynski 1984; Porter and Millar reviewed, a quite different approach is proposed and 1985).
justified.
After the 1980s generated a wealth of "how to build an Consider the following questions raised by current concep-SIS" recipes, the nineties have begun with a period of tions of SIS design critical reflection (Hopper 1990) . The systematic application of SIS design methodologies did not, in fact, yield a
• Limitation has always been the driving force behind commensurate number of successful cases -at least not the diffusion of any technological innovation (Rosenwhen measured against the pioneering technologies cited berg 1982). SIS represents no exception. However, if
above. An intensive review of relevant empirical and every major player in the industry adopts the same or theoretical literature suggests a number of reasons for a similar SIS, any competitive advantage plainly these discrepancies. evaporates. Systems that can be copied and built by a large number of firms, where no firms enjoy any • The hand, the theoretical literature emphasizes distinctive or sustainable advantage in implementation rational assessments of the firm and its environment can only generate normal economic returns. In partiby top management as the means to strategy formulacular, small firms are at a special disadvantage in tion. It ignores alternative conceptions available in applying standard SIS planning approaches and soluinnovation literature that stress learning over thinking tions in that they will find it very difficult to manipu-late the industry structure to their advantage through integrating unique ideas and practical design solutions the strategic use of IT. at the end user level turns out to be more important than the adoption of structured approaches to systems • Some Inter-Organizational Systems (IOS) require the development or industry analysis (Schoen 1979 ; connection of all the major firms in an industry, as is Ciborra and 1.anmra 1990 based on unanalyzable, and even opaque, areas such differed considerably (e.g., decreasing costs electronic as organizational culture. The investigation and integration), the driving force for the introduction of such enactment of unique sources of practice and know how systems was that other firms in the same industry had at the firm and industry level can be the source of similar applications (75% of the cases); other systems were sustained advantage.
developed in collaboration with companies in the same industry (8%), while for another 8% they were individual • developing an SIS is much closer to prototyping and initiatives soon to be copied by competitors. In sum, "more to deploying end users' ingenuity than has been than 92% of the systems studied follow industry wide realized (Brown and Duguid 1989) . In fact, many SIS trends. Only three systems are really original, but they will have emerged out of plain hacking. The capability of probably be promptly imitated" (Brousseau 1990 ).
Asaconsequence, aiming at sustainable advantagerequires More generally, this school of thought can be questioned continuously generating innovative and competitive on three counts (Mintzberg 1990 ). applications and then successfully protecting that unique advantage over some time period. Feeny and Ives (1989) -Making strategy explicit The rational bias for full recommend, for example, that in order to reap a long term explicit articulation of strategy assumes, implicitly, that advantage from investments in an SIS, a firm should theenvironmentishighly predictableandtheunfolding carefully analyze the lead time required for competitors to of events is itself sequenced, to allow for an orderly develop a system similar to the one being considered and process of formulation, design and implementation. it should look for asymmetries in organizational structure, However, during implementation surprises often occur culture, size, etc., that may slow down the integration of that call into question carefully developed plans the new SIS within competitors' organizations. (Bikson Stasz and Mankin 1985) . The need for continuous opportunistic revisions clashes with the Although such suggestions are very valuable, they do not inflexibility of the formulation and implementation entirely avoid the dilemmas faced by SIS design. For sequence. example, if it is possible for the innovator to employ a consulting service to identify specific forces that can keep
• One-woy relationship between strategy and structure.
followers and imitators at bay, the latter can always acquire
In the conventional perspective, the strategist is consultants and services to help overcome those impediregarded as an independent observer who can exercise ments. We claim, instead, that more effective tactics for judgement in a way that is removed from the everyday SIS design will come from challenging the approaches to reality of the organization. It is appropriate to begin by considering the rational shows that such biases are at work in any decision perspective on strategy fonnulation, applied by authors making process (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) , they such as Porter and Millar (1985) , from the business are assumed away by the rationalist orientation of strategy to current SIS issues. According to such a most approaches to strategic systems. Everyday life in perspective, management should first engage in a purely by the structure of the industry within which the firms terminals Minitel) -will now be reconsidered for the light operate. In order to achieve a competitive advantage, they can shed on these issues. At a closer look, such cases firmsshould manipulatethe structuralcharacteristicsof the emphasize the discrepancy between ideal plans for an SIS industry through IT -for instance, by creating barriers to and the realities of implementation.
entry, product differentiation, links with suppliers, and so on (Porter and Millar 1985) . However, as Barney (1985a) ASAP, the system launched by AHS Corporation (subsehas noted ill the field of strategy and Wiseman (1988) in quently acquired by Baxter), started as an operational, the field of SIS, there are alternative conceptions of localized response to a customer need (Venkatraman and competition that may be relevant to SIS development. Short 1990). Because of difficulties in serving a hospital effectively, a manager of a local AHS office gave preOne contrasting alternative is the theory of monopolistic punched cards to the hospital's purchacing department; the competition put forward by Chamberlin (1933) on this ordering clerks could then transfer the information on the view: firms are heterogeneous. They compete on the cards expeditiously through a phone terminal. From this basis of certain resource and asset differences, such as local ad hoc solution to a particular problem, the idea technical know-how, reputation, ability for teamwork, gradually emerged of linking all the customer hospitals in organizational culture and skills, and other "invisible assets" the same way through touch-tone telephones, bar code (Itami 198D. Differences of these kinds will make some readers, teletypes and eventually PCs. At a later stage, firms able to implement high return strategies. Competi-AHS management realized the positive impact such an tion then means cultivating unique strengths and capaelectronic link with the customers could have on profits bilities, and defending them against imitation by other and was able to allocate adequate resources for its further firms.
Another perspective on competition is Schumpeter's McKesson's Economost, another order-entry system, (1950), who sees it as a process linked to innovation in started in a similar way. The former IS manager admits product, market or technology. Innovation, in turn, is that "behind the legend" there was simply a local initiative more the outcome of the capitalist process of creative by one of the business units. The system was not devedestruction than the result of a strategic planning process.
loped according to a company-wide strategic plan; rather, Ability at guessing, learning and sheer luck appear in such it was the outcome of an evolutionary, piecemeal process a perspective to be key competitive factors (Barney 1985b about McKesson's new information systems. According to the first strategy is formulated in advance, on the basis of an industry analysis; it consists of a series of SABRE, the pioneering computerized reservation system moves that can be planned and subsequently implemented, built by American Airlines, was not originally conceived as to gain an advantage relative to competing firms in the a biased distribution channel to create entry barriers for same industry structure. According to the second theme, competitors while tying in travel agents. In fact, it began strategy formulation is difficult to plan before the fact, and as a relatively simple, inventory-management system competitive advantage stems from exploiting the unique addressing a specific need which had nothing to do with characteristics of the firm and unleashing its innovating ensuring a competitive advantage. On the contrary, it was capabilities.
supposed to address an internal inefficiency: American's relative inability, compared to other airlines, to monitor the Looking more closely at some well known SIS applications inventory of available seats and to attribute passenger suggests that there is a wide gap between the prevailing names to booked seats (Hopper 1990 knowledge about resources, goals, tasks markets, products of Minitel occurred before the diffusion of the personal and processes. The skills and competencies available in a computer) but not a sufficient one. Nonetheless, at the corporation represent at the same time sources and beginning the use of Minitel was sluggish, probably for the constraints for innovation (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) .
same reason other Videotex systems never took off.
The creation of new knowledge can take place in two nonexclusive ways. The first is to rely on local information
To be successful, the Minitel had to be different from and routine behavior, extending them gradually when other media; it had to be "active.' In fact, the system also coping with a new task (examples include learning by provided messaging capabilities, but was never promoted doing incremental decision making, and muddling as a public e-mail service by the DGT. Only because an through). Accessing more diverse and distant information, act of hacking attracted the interest of the national press when an adequate level of competence is not present, was this potential discovered and actualized by millions of would instead lead to errors and further divergence from users. During an experiment in Strasbourg, when a local optimal performance (Heiner 1983 ). newspaper put its classified ads section on videote,4 a hacker -probably located at the dp unit of the newspaper This approach requires allowing and even encouraging itself -started using the Minitcl to respond to the ads tinkering by people close to the operational level so that establishing a direct, electronic dialogue with their authors. they can combine and apply known tools and techniques to This was the beginning of the Minitel as an electronic mail solve new problems. No general scheme or model is system (messagerie) instead ofjust a system for accessing available; rather, local cues from a situation are trusted a database (Marchand 198D . At that point, the number and exploited in a somewhat unreflective way, aiming at ad of terminals in homes turned out to constitute a critical hoc solutions by heuristics rather than high theory. mass, starting a virtual circle. For instance, the network Systems like ASAP or the Minitel were developed in this created a new marketplace where many independent way. Even when big plans were present, it was b,icolage service companies could sell their services. Customers that lead to the innovation. The value of tinkering lies in immediately used the "new" medium -so much so that the the fact that it keeps the development of an SIS close to national backbone packet switched network, Transpac, the competencies of the organization and to on-going broke down due to overload. France Telecom was flexible fluctuations in local practices.
and pragmatic enough to adapt the infrastructure technically and commercially to the new pattern of usage which
The second route to new knowledge is to attack the had emerged outside the initial vision and plans; it moved competency gap directly, forging new competencies to "from the logic of storage to the logic of traffic" (Schneider emerge and consolidate. This is a process of radical et al. 1990). learning that entails restructuring the cognitive and organiintional backgrounds that give meaning to the practices, routines and skills at hand (Brown 1991) . This
The most frequently cited SIS successes of the 1980s, then approach leads to new systems and arrangements, but not tell the same story. Innovative SISs are not fully designed by "random walks" or tinkering; at the opposite extreme, top-down or introduced in one shot; rather, they are tried it intentionally challenges and smashes established routines out through prototyping and tinkering. In contrast, strategy in particular, it attacks day-to-day assumptions that define formulation and design take place in pre-existing cognitive competence, learning by doing and learning by trial and frames and organizational contexts that usually prevent error. From this view point, designing an innovative SIS designers and sponsors from seeing and exploiting the would involve more than market analysis systems analysis potential for innovation. requirements specifications and interest accommodation.
Rather, it should deal primarily with the structures and 1990). We identify seven oxymorons as alternative "planframes within which such exercises take place, i.e., with ning" guidelines that can increase organizational skill in shaping and restructuring the context of both business developing an SIS. The first four oxymorons are aimed at policy and systems development. Such a context can be transformingb*colage and learning-by-doing into activities surfaced and changed onlyby interveningin situations and that increase the probability of "stumbling upon" SIS designing-in-action (Schoen 1979 knowledge (Nonaka 1988b o,ganizational capabilities for converting such data into 102 -111. practical knowledge for action. SIS applications are most likely to develop close to -and to serve -the grassroots of Brown, J. S., and Duguid, P. "Learning and Improvisation the organization, where its core competencies and skills are -Local Sources of Global Innovation." Xerox Parc, daily deployed and perfected. mimeograph, 1989. 
